Courting the Middle Powers: Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines

Not all key players in the Indo-Pacific are formal U.S. allies or major powers. Countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines occupy a middle tier, neither superpowers nor minor states, yet their choices carry significant weight for the region’s future. These “middle powers” each have populations over 100 million (or close to it, in the case of Vietnam and the Philippines), vibrant economies, and growing strategic heft. Crucially, they share a desire to maintain their own autonomy amidst U.S.-China competition. For Washington, engaging these nations requires a nuanced touch: they are eager for partnership and investment but allergic to anything that smells of domination or a loss of independence. U.S. strategy recognizes this reality.

Vietnam and Indonesia, for example, are identified as high-potential partners even though they lack formal alliances with the U.S. The Philippines, a longstanding treaty ally, has recently re-embraced the U.S. after a period of estrangement, illustrating the ebb and flow of influence. In each case, the American approach combines respect for sovereignty with a clear offer of mutual benefit, aiming to draw these pivotal states closer over time without forcing them to choose sides outright.

Vietnam: From Foes to Comprehensive Partners

Vietnam’s trajectory with the United States has been remarkable: from Cold War adversaries to, as of 2023, a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Hanoi and Washington. Vietnam’s importance is hard to overstate; it sits at the crossroads of Southeast Asia, has one of the fastest-growing economies in the region, and shares a long border (and a sometimes contentious relationship) with China. The U.S. has courted Vietnam by aligning with what Vietnam itself seeks: economic growth, technological advancement, and protection of its sovereignty (especially in the South China Sea). In recent years, the U.S. lifted a decades-old arms embargo on Vietnam and began modest defense cooperation, like port visits by U.S. Navy ships and support for Vietnam’s coast guard. 

But Washington has been careful to calibrate its approach. Vietnamese leadership is communist and maintains a non-aligned posture; overt pressure on human rights or pushing Vietnam to openly side against Beijing could backfire. Instead, the U.S. largely engages on pragmatic terms, maritime security, trade, education, and war legacy issues, building trust step by step. This patient approach paid off when Vietnam agreed to elevate ties in 2023 and welcomed increased U.S. investment in areas like semiconductors and renewable energy. American companies are now investing in Vietnam’s booming tech manufacturing sector (for instance, building semiconductor assembly and testing facilities), which dovetails with Vietnam’s interest in diversifying its economy away from over-reliance on China. The forward-looking goal is to embed Vietnam as a critical node in the U.S.-led regional network, not as an ally in a military sense, but as a confident friend that increasingly aligns with the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Indonesia: Engaging a Nonaligned Giant

Indonesia, the world’s third-largest democracy and the economic heavyweight of Southeast Asia, is another linchpin that the U.S. is actively engaging. Historically, Indonesia has been firmly nonaligned, priding itself on an independent foreign policy (“free and active”). For the U.S., this means Jakarta will never be a treaty ally like Australia or Japan, but it can be a valuable partner on its own terms. The U.S. strategy toward Indonesia emphasizes support for its development aspirations and respect for its leadership role in ASEAN.

On the economic front, the U.S. has supported Indonesia’s infrastructure and digital growth through both government programs and private investment. A recent example is a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact with Indonesia, which directs hundreds of millions of dollars to transportation and climate-related infrastructure, with no political strings, only requirements for transparency and good governance. Additionally, Indonesia has been a focus country in Indo-Pacific Economic Framework discussions, particularly in the supply chain and clean economy pillars, given its large market and resource base.

In terms of security, the U.S. has gradually expanded cooperation with the Indonesian military, within the limits of Indonesia’s constitutional prohibitions on foreign alliances. Joint exercises like the Garuda Shield have grown in scale, and the U.S. has provided capacity-building support to Indonesian maritime forces (e.g., donating Coast Guard cutters to help Indonesia patrol its vast archipelagic waters). Recognizing Indonesia’s sensitivities, the U.S. treads carefully on contentious issues.

For instance, while quietly encouraging Indonesia to speak up against excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea, Washington publicly frames such support in terms of upholding international law, a principle Jakarta itself espouses. By treating Indonesia as a co-equal partner and regional leader, hosting high-level visits, endorsing Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Outlook, and involving it in initiatives like the expanded G20, the U.S. reinforces that it sees Indonesian sovereignty as an asset, not an obstacle. Over time, these gestures aim to tilt Indonesia’s strategic calculus so that even as it remains nonaligned, it finds ever greater overlap of interests with the U.S. vision of regional order.

The Philippines: Revitalizing an Alliance

Among the three, the Philippines is unique as a formal U.S. ally since 1951. Yet even alliances require tending, and recently the U.S.-Philippines relationship has experienced whiplash. Under President Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022), the Philippines distanced itself from Washington and flirted with Beijing, frustrated in part by perceived slights and colonial baggage. But as Chinese pressure on Philippine maritime claims grew, the pendulum swung back. The current Philippine government under President Marcos Jr. has warmly welcomed renewed U.S. support, opening a new chapter in the alliance.

The U.S. has seized this window to strengthen the partnership on multiple fronts. Militarily, the two sides have expanded the scope of joint exercises and accelerated the implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which grants U.S. forces access to several Philippine bases. Strategically located near the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, the Philippines offers the U.S. a vital foothold, and in return, the U.S. is explicitly reaffirming that its defense treaty extends to any armed attack on Philippine forces, including in the South China Sea.

But unlike in past eras, U.S. engagement today is not narrowly focused on security. Recognizing that the Philippine public opinion cares deeply about economic development and human security, the U.S. has ramped up initiatives in health, education, and disaster relief for the Philippines. For example, USAID is funding extensive programs to build climate resilience in typhoon-prone regions and to support conflict recovery and development in Mindanao (a region where instability has threatened Philippine security). 

These efforts boost the everyday welfare of Filipinos, reinforcing the point that alliance with America brings tangible benefits to ordinary people. Meanwhile, to dispel any notion of heavy-handedness, U.S. officials have been careful to stress Philippine sovereignty. For instance, when U.S. and Philippine forces conduct joint patrols, they are framed as supporting the Philippines’ own rights and interests in its exclusive economic zone. This respectful stance, combined with high-profile projects like new investments in the Philippine semiconductor assembly industry, has broadly sustained Filipino public support for the alliance. Of course, the Philippines’ internal politics remain fluid, and anti-American nationalism can resurface, so the U.S. is working to “future-proof” the alliance by widening it beyond defense: more business ties, university partnerships, and cultural exchanges that bind the two societies closer, regardless of who leads in Manila.

Looking Ahead: Converging Trajectories

Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines will never be identical in their relationships with Washington; each has its own history and constraints. However, the trajectory the U.S. hopes to cultivate is one of steady convergence, in which each of these nations, in its own way, finds it increasingly beneficial to cooperate closely with the United States. A telling indicator will be how these countries navigate their relations with China. If, in a decade, Vietnam has deepened defense consultations with the U.S., Indonesia routinely partners with America on infrastructure and regional diplomatic initiatives, and the Philippines has irreversibly anchored itself as a core U.S. ally in Southeast Asia, it will signal that U.S. engagement has been effective. The U.S. is not asking these nations to sever ties with China; indeed, all three will maintain significant economic links with Beijing. Instead, success means they have balanced those links with robust ties to the U.S. that give them options and leverage.

Challenges persist: Vietnam’s one-party system means warming too much to the U.S. can provoke internal backlash; Indonesia’s inclination to neutrality can breed caution toward U.S.-led projects; the Philippines may again face leadership that questions the alliance. The U.S. approach, therefore, emphasizes consistency and attentiveness. By showing up reliably, whether to help Indonesia fight a pandemic, to stand by the Philippines in a maritime standoff, or to support Vietnam’s tech aspirations, Washington builds credibility that outlasts transient disagreements. In many ways, these middle powers are barometers of America’s standing in the Indo-Pacific. If they continue moving closer, it suggests the U.S. regional strategy is aligning with what nations want: partnership without pressure, and security without strings.