Navigating Adversaries: A Strategy for Latin America’s Distant States (Tier 3)

Not every nation in the Americas is ready or willing to join the march toward a closer U.S. partnership. A handful of countries remain on the opposite side of the fence, whether due to ideological choices, authoritarian leadership, or alignment with U.S. rivals. These are the Tier 3 states: distant or adversarial governments that have strained or openly antagonistic relations with Washington. In Latin America today, this category is epitomized by the authoritarian-socialist bloc: Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and, to a lesser extent, Bolivia under its current regime. How should the U.S. and its allies handle these outliers? The challenge is to contain their destabilizing impacts while preparing for potential futures where they could re-engage. It’s a delicate balancing act of firmness and patience.

Containment and Mitigation

The first order of business is to protect U.S. interests and regional stability from any threats posed by Tier 3 regimes. This means continuing strong measures to limit these governments' ability to harm their neighbors or the U.S. For instance, Venezuela under the Maduro regime has been subject to U.S. sanctions aimed at its oil sector and individuals, to pressure for a return to democracy. Those sanctions, coupled with diplomatic isolation, serve to contain Venezuela’s reach, denying the regime resources that could be used to undermine other democracies or fund proxy activities. Similarly, Cuba’s government, which has a long adversarial history with Washington, remains under embargo and other restrictions. While the Cold War is over, Cuba’s tight links with powers like Russia (and now some cooperation with China) keep it in Tier 3. The U.S. strategy there is to prevent Cuba from becoming a security foothold for adversaries; for example, if Russia were to consider basing military assets or if China were to build a spy facility (as has been rumored). Enhanced U.S. intelligence and even naval presence in the Caribbean can deter such moves.

Containment isn’t only military or economic; it’s also about managing spillover crises. Venezuela again provides a stark example: its economic collapse and repression have driven millions of refugees into Colombia, Brazil, and beyond, creating a humanitarian and stability issue. The U.S. has worked with Colombia and others to help absorb and support these refugees (through aid programs, refugee resettlement, etc.). This “containment of harm” approach acknowledges that, while we may not be able to solve Venezuela’s internal issues in the short term, we can at least alleviate pressure on neighbors and our own borders (Venezuelan migration has reached as far as the U.S. southern border, too). Managing the migration crisis through humanitarian assistance, supporting regional asylum processing, and coordinating refugee policies are key to mitigating Tier 3 fallout.

Another aspect is curbing any subversive influences that Tier 3 states might project. Nicaragua, for instance, has become increasingly autocratic and anti-U.S. under Ortega, and it has flirted with allowing extra-hemispheric actors greater influence. The U.S. and allies should keep a watchful eye on things like Nicaragua’s invitations to Russian security forces or its drug trafficking and organized crime activities. Sanctions on key figures, revoking visas, and boosting support for neighboring Costa Rica (which often feels Nicaragua’s spillover effects) are tools to contain Nicaragua’s negative impacts.

Limited Engagement: Keeping the Door Ajar

Even as we contain, it’s important not to completely shut out Tier 3 societies. Limited engagement, where feasible, can lay the groundwork for future normalization if/when these countries change course. This might include maintaining low-level diplomatic relations and engaging in talks on specific issues. For example, U.S. diplomats have quietly negotiated with Venezuela’s regime on matters such as prisoner releases and even sanctions relief in exchange for promises of electoral reforms. While outcomes have been mixed, these contacts are necessary to test openings and to communicate U.S. positions clearly (e.g., what the regime must do to have sanctions lifted).

Cuba is a case where the U.S. has toggled between isolation and engagement. The current stance is more isolationist (reversing the Obama-era thaw), due to a lack of political change in Havana and crackdowns on dissent. Yet even now, the U.S. allows some people-to-people contact and remittances, and cooperates on issues like air traffic and disaster response, which serve mutual interests. Continuing small-scale academic, cultural, or athletic exchanges helps maintain a bridge to the Cuban people, even if the government relationship is frosty. Notably, areas like global health or environmental protection could be avenues to talk; e.g., cooperating on pandemics or marine conservation in the Gulf of Mexico, without delving into politics.

The guiding principle is to signal that the U.S. opposes the regimes’ behavior, not the people. Offering humanitarian aid directly to the people of Tier 3 countries, when possible, underscores that distinction. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. offered vaccines broadly, including to nations with hostile governments (whether they accepted is another matter). Similarly, after natural disasters (such as hurricanes hitting Cuba or earthquakes in Venezuela), U.S. humanitarian gestures can win goodwill among populations, even if their leaders reject or begrudge the aid.

The Long Game: Readiness for Change

Historically, closed regimes can and do eventually open or fall. The U.S. must play the long game of being ready to support transitions in Tier 3 states. This means doing homework now: planning for how to assist a democratic transition or economic rebuilding if one of these governments changes. In Venezuela’s case, the white paper suggests preparing a special reconstruction fund with allies for the day after Maduro. For Cuba, it could involve quietly coordinating with allies like the EU or OAS on what a post-Castro transition assistance might look like (acknowledging that it could be gradual). The idea is that when cracks appear, say mass protests, or a succession crisis in an authoritarian state, the U.S. has a toolkit ready: financial aid, technical advisors, election support teams, debt relief plans, etc., to help steer the country toward democracy and alliance integration swiftly.

There’s also a diplomatic narrative to maintain: consistently affirming that doors are open if these countries choose a different path. President Reagan famously did this with the Soviet Union and its satellites, condemning repression but also offering partnership if they reformed. Similarly, U.S. leaders today should articulate, for example, “If Venezuela returns to democracy, we stand ready to welcome it back into the inter-American community and help its economy recover.” This not only pressures the regimes by giving hope to their opposition movements, it also signals to other countries that the U.S. has principled consistency (we are against these regimes for reasons of values, not out of caprice).

An important part of the long game is working with Tier 1 and Tier 2 allies to collectively handle Tier 3. Latin American democracies themselves have a stake in this. Many host refugees from Venezuela or have suffered from narcotics pouring out of these states. Through the OAS or ad hoc coalitions (such as the Lima Group, formed to address Venezuela’s crisis), the U.S. can lead a multilateral approach. This spreads the burden; it’s not just “Yankee imperialism” against socialist governments, but a regional consensus that democracy and stability are being undermined by those regimes. By demonstrating to Tier 3 regimes that their neighbors also disapprove and are preparing for post-regime scenarios, it might increase pressure for change from within.

Accepting Limits but Protecting Principles

It’s important to acknowledge that some Tier 3 relationships will remain cold as long as those governments remain in power. The U.S. cannot compromise on core principles (like democratic governance and human rights) just to bring a Cuba or a Nicaragua into an alliance. Doing so would undermine the very foundation of the alliance-driven globalization we aim for, which is built on shared values. So, in the interim, coexistence with tension is a reality. The alliance strategy smartly notes that we should “hedge and secure interests elsewhere” because Tier 3 regimes exist. For example, because Venezuela is no longer a reliable oil supplier due to its political situation, the U.S. has bolstered partnerships with other oil producers (such as increasing imports from Colombia or encouraging Guyana’s new oil industry). Or since Nicaragua isn’t cooperating on regional security, the U.S. works more with Costa Rica and Panama to fill gaps.

The flip side is that Tier 3 economies (apart from Venezuela’s oil) are not central to global supply chains, so the rest of the hemisphere can progress without them for now. Cuba’s and Nicaragua’s economies are relatively small. Bolivia has minerals (lithium), but its output is limited by poor policies; the U.S. is focusing on lithium in Argentina and Chile instead. This means the hemisphere’s development can largely bypass Tier 3 states until they hopefully evolve. It’s a somewhat sad reality for the citizens under those regimes, but it also reassures that a few holdouts won’t derail the overall project.

Forward-Looking Implications: The approach to Tier 3 has implications for the U.S.'s moral and strategic credibility in Latin America. By standing firm against authoritarianism, the U.S. reaffirms its commitment to democracy, something allies will expect. It also draws a clear line that the alliance is fundamentally a community of values, not just convenience. For regional partners, seeing the U.S. and others hold the line on principles can encourage them to do likewise (e.g., Caribbean countries historically soft on Cuba might take a tougher stance if they see a united front and get support for any economic fallout).

In a hopeful scenario, by the mid- to late-2030s, one or more of the Tier 3 states will have transformed. Venezuela could have a new government that rejoins the free trade system and starts exporting oil under transparent conditions, boosting regional energy security. Cuba might undergo a generational change that loosens the one-party grip, enabling more openness and U.S. investment in a post-communist economy. Nicaragua or Bolivia could see new leadership that rebalances their foreign relations. The alliance’s preparatory work would then quickly swing into action to integrate these nations, turning former flashpoints into contributors to hemispheric prosperity. That would be a crowning achievement: healing the last rifts of the Americas and truly uniting nearly all of the Western Hemisphere under a shared banner of development and democracy.

Until then, the U.S. and its allies will practice strategic patience, containing threats, helping suffering people where we can, and quietly smoothing the path for eventual reintegration. Tier 3 strategy, in essence, is about defending against the worst while hoping for the best. By neither ignoring nor obsessing over these adversarial states, the U.S. keeps focus on building a positive alliance among willing nations, confident that time and history are on the side of freedom in the Americas.